Historically, much of the banking regulation that was put in place was designed to reduce systemic risk. In many countries capital regulation in the form of the Basel agreements is currently one of the most important measures to reduce systemic risk. In recent years there has been considerable growth in the transfer of credit risk across and between sectors of the …nancial system. In particular there is evidence that risk has been transfered from the banking sector to the insurance sector. One argument is that this is desirable and simply re ‡ects diversi…cation opportunities. Another is that it represents regulatory arbitrage and the concentration of risk that may result from this could increase systemic risk. This paper shows that both scenarios are possible depending on whether markets and contracts are complete or incomplete.
Introduction
The experience of banking crises in the 1930s was severe. Before this assuring …nancial stability was primarily the responsibility of central banks. The Bank of England had led the way. The last true panic in England was associated with the collapse of the Overend, Gurney and Company in 1866. After that the Bank avoided crises by skilful manipulation of the discount rate and supply of liquidity to the market. Many other central banks followed suit and by the end of the nineteenth century crises in Europe were rare. Although the Federal Reserve System was founded in 1914 its decentralized structure meant that it was not able to e¤ectively prevent banking crises. The e¤ect of the banking crises in the 1930s was so detrimental that in addition to reforming the Federal Reserve System the US also imposed many types of banking regulation to prevent systemic risk. These included capital adequacy standards, asset restrictions, liquidity requirements, reserve requirements, interest rate ceilings on deposits, and restrictions on services and product lines. Over the years many of these regulations have been removed. However, capital adequacy requirements in the form of the Basel agreements remain.
If properly designed and implemented capital regulations may reduce systemic risk. However, the growing importance of credit risk transfer has raised concerns about whether regulation as currently implemented does increase …nancial stability. The evidence reviewed below suggests that there is a signi…cant transfer of risk from the banks to insurance companies. One view is that this credit risk transfer is desirable because it allows diversi…cation between di¤erent sectors of the …nancial system that cannot be achieved in other ways. On the other hand, if the transfer arises because of ill-designed regulations it may be undesirable. For example, regulatory arbitrage between the banking and insurance sectors could conceivably lead to an increase in risk in the insurance sector which increases overall systemic risk. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate both of these arguments. We consider whether diversi…cation across sectors can improve the allocation of resources and whether poorly designed and implemented capital regulation can lead to an increase in systemic risk.
Our analysis builds on our previous work on …nancial crises (see, e.g., Allen and Gale (1998 , 2000a -c, 2004a and Gale (2003 Gale ( , 2004 ). In Allen and Gale (2004a) we argued that …nancial regulation should be based on a careful analysis of the market failure that justi…es government intervention. We developed a model of intermediaries and …nancial markets in which inter-mediaries could trade risk. It was shown that provided …nancial markets and …nancial contracts are complete the allocation is incentive e¢ cient. When contracts are incomplete, for example, if the banks use deposit contracts with …xed promised payments, then the allocation is constrained e¢ cient. In other words, there is no justi…cation for regulation by the government. In order for regulation to be justi…ed markets must be incomplete. As in standard theories of government regulation it is …rst necessary to identify a market failure to analyze intervention.
In this paper we start in Section 2 by considering the institutional background of credit risk transfer. We consider the evidence on how important risk transfers are quantitatively and which entities they occur between. Section 3 develops a model with a banking sector where consumers deposit their funds and …rms borrow and repay these loans with some probability. There is also an insurance sector. Some …rms have an asset that may be damaged. They require insurance to allow this asset to be repaired if it is damaged. The equilibrium with complete markets and contracts is characterized. In this case complete markets allow full risk sharing. Section 4 develops an example with incomplete markets and contracts and shows how ine¢ cient capital regulation can increase systemic risk. Finally Section 5 contains concluding remarks.
Institutional background on credit risk transfer
Credit risk has been transferred between parties for many years. Bank guarantees and credit insurance provided by insurance companies, for example, have a long history. Securitization of mortgages occurred in the 1970s. Bank loans were syndicated in the 1970s and secondary markets for bank loans developed in the 1980s. In recent years a number of other methods of risk transfer have come to be widely used. Table 1 ( BIS (2003) ) shows the size of credit risk transfer markets using various instruments from [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] . Institutions transferring risk out are referred to as "risk shedders" while institutions taking on risk on are referred to as "risk buyers". One important class of instrument is credit derivatives. An example of these is credit default swaps. These are bilateral contracts where the risk shedder pays a …xed periodic fee in exchange for a payment contingent on an event such as default on a reference asset or assets. The contingent payment is provided by the risk buyer. With asset-backed securities, loans, bonds, or other receivables are transferred to a special purpose vehicle (SPV). The payo¤s from these assets are then paid out to investors. The credit risk of the instruments in the SPV is borne by the investors. The underlying pool of assets in asset-backed securities is relatively homogeneous. Collateralized debt obligations also use an SPV but have more heterogeneous assets. Payouts are tranched with claims on the pools separated into di¤erent degrees of seniority in bankruptcy and timing of default. The equity tranche is the residual claim and has the highest risk. The mezzanine tranche comes next in priority. The senior tranche has the highest priority and is often AAA rated.
It can be seen from Table 1 that the use of all types of credit risk transfer has increased substantially. The growth has been particularly rapid in credit derivatives and collateralized debt obligations, however. Despite this rapid growth a comparison of the outstanding amounts of credit risk transfer instruments with the total outstanding amounts of bank credit and corporate debt securities shows that they remain small in relative terms. Corporates, insurance companies and the other buyers do not constitute an important part of demand in the market. From Panel B, it can be seen that banks are also important sellers of credit protection. In contrast to their involvement as buyers, the role of insurance companies as sellers is signi…cant. Securities houses also sell signi…cant amounts while the remaining institutions play a fairly limited role. The results of a survey contained in Fitch (2003) are consistent with Table 2 . They found that the global insurance sector had a net seller position after deducting protection bought of $283 billion. The global banking industry purchased $97 billion of credit protection. A signi…cant amount of risk is thus being transferred into the insurance industry from banks and other …nancial institutions.
As discussed in the introduction, these …gures raise the important issue of why these transfers of risk are taking place. Is it the result of …nancial institutions seeking to diversify their risk? Alternatively, is it the result of regulatory arbitrage and if so can this arbitrage lead to a concentration of risk that increases the probability of systemic collapse?
We turn to the role of credit risk transfer in allowing diversi…cation between di¤erent sectors of the economy next.
Diversi…cation through credit risk transfer
In this section we adapt a familiar model of intermediation by adding an insurance sector. Since the risks faced by the insurance sector are not perfectly correlated with the risks faced by the banking sector, there is scope for diversi…cation. This is the basic motive for credit risk transfer. We …rst consider an Arrow-Debreu model, where credit risk transfer takes place through markets in which insurance companies and intermediaries hedge their risks. Since markets are complete, risk sharing is Pareto-e¢ cient. In later sections, we consider the implications of missing markets.
The basic model
There are three dates t = 0; 1; 2 and a single, all-purpose good that can be used for consumption or investment at each date.
There are two sectors in the …nancial system, the banking sector and the insurance sector. We assume that each sector consists of a large number of competitive …rms and that their lines of business do not overlap. This is a strong assumption but a necessary one, since the combination of insurance and intermediation activities in a single …nancial institution would obviate the need for credit risk transfer.
There are two securities, one short and one long. The short security is represented by a storage technology: one unit at date t produces one unit at date t + 1. The long security is represented by a constant-returns-to-scale investment technology that takes two periods to mature: one unit invested in the long security at date 0 produces R > 1 units of the good at date 2 (and nothing at date 1).
In addition to these securities, banks and insurance companies have distinct direct-investment opportunities. Banks can make loans to …rms which succeed with probability . More precisely, each …rm borrows one unit at date 0 and invests in a risky venture that produces B units of the good at date 2 if successful and 0 if unsuccessful. There is assumed to be an in…nite supply of such …rms, so the banks take all the surplus. (In e¤ect, these "…rms" simply represent a risky, constant-returns-to-scale, investment technology for the banks).
The bank's other customers are depositors, who have one unit of the good at date 0 and none at dates 1 and 2. Depositors are uncertain of their preferences: with probability they are early consumers, who only value the good at date 1 and with probability 1 they are late consumers, who only value the good at date 2. Uncertainty about time preferences generates a preference for liquidity and a role for the intermediary as a provider of liquidity insurance. The utility of consumption is represented by a utility function U (c) with the usual properties. We normalize the number of consumers to 1.
The insurance companies have access to a large number of …rms, whose measure is normalized to one. Each …rm owns an asset that produces A units of the good at date 2. With probability the asset su¤ers some damage at date 1. Unless this damage is repaired, at a cost of C, the asset becomes worthless and will produce nothing at date 2. The …rms also have a unit endowment at date 0 which the insurance company invests in the short and long securities in order to pay the …rms'damages at date 1.
Finally, we introduce a class of risk neutral investors who provide "capital" to the insurance and banking sectors. Although investors are risk neutral, we assume that their consumption must be non-negative at each date. Otherwise, the investors could absorb all risk and provide unlimited liquidity. The investor's utility function is de…ned by
where c t 0 denotes the investor's consumption at date t = 0; 1; 2. The constant > E[R] represents the investor's opportunity cost of funds. An investor's endowment consists of a large (unbounded) amount of the good at date 0 and nothing at dates 1 and 2.
We can assume without loss of generality that the role of investors is simply to provide capital to the intermediary through the contract e = (e 0 ; e 1 ; e 2 ) where e 0 0 denotes the investor's supply of capital at date t = 0; and e t 0 denotes the investor's consumption at dates t = 1; 2. While it is feasible for the investors to invest in assets at date 0 and trade them at date 1, it can never be pro…table for them to do so in equilibrium. More precisely, the no-arbitrage conditions ensure that pro…ts from trading assets are zero or negative at any admissible prices and the investor's preferences for consumption at date 0 imply that the investors will never want to invest in assets at date 0 and consume the returns at dates 1 and 2. An investor's endowment consists of a large amount of the good W 0 at date 0 and nothing at dates 1 and 2. This assumption has two important implications. First, since the investors have a large endowment at date 0 and the capital market is competitive, there will be excess supply of capital unless the investors receive no surplus in equilibrium. Secondly, the fact that investors have no endowment (and non-negative consumption) at dates 1 and 2 implies that their capital must be converted into assets in order to provide risk sharing at dates 1 and 2.
We can then write the investors'utility in the form:
u(e 0 ; e 1 ; e 2 ) = W 0 e 0 + e 1 + e 2 :
For the purposes of illustrating the scope for diversi…cation, we assume a structure of uncertainty is one that allows for some diversi…cation and some aggregate risk. This is achieved by assuming that the proportions of damaged …rms for the insurance sector and failing …rms for the banking sector equal the probabilities and , respectively, and that these probabilities are themselves random. Most uncertainty is resolved at the beginning of date 1. Banks' depositors learn whether they are early or late consumers and insurance companies learn which …rms have damaged assets. The distribution of returns among …rms borrowing from banks is also determined. Which of these …rms fail is learned at date 2.
An Arrow-Debreu equilibrium
Let s = 1; :::; S denote the aggregate states of nature and write the probabilities of damage and failure in state s as (s) and (s) respectively. The true state of nature is uncertain at date 0 and is revealed at date 1.
There are 1 + 2S contingent commodities in the economy: the good at date 0, the good at date 1 in state s = 1; :::; S and the good at date 2 in state s = 1; :::; S. We assume that there are markets for each of the contingent commodities at date 0. (There is no need for separate asset markets because assets are simply bundles of contingent commodities and can be priced and traded as such). The good at date 0 is the numeraire and the price of one unit of the good at date t in state s is denoted by q t (s).
Consumers deposit their endowments with the intermediary at date 0 and receive in return a consumption allocation at date 1 or date 2 depending on whether they are early or late consumers. Let c 1 (s) denote the consumption o¤ered by the intermediary to an early consumer at date 1 in state s and let c 2 (s) denote the consumption o¤ered to a late consumer at date 2 in state s. Since the consumer does not know the true state or his type at date 0, his expected utility from the risk-sharing contract will be
where E[ ] denotes the expectation with respect to the probability distribution of the state s. Free entry into the banking sector ensures competition among the intermediaries. In equilibrium, intermediaries o¤er a risk-sharing contract that maximizes the expected utility of the typical depositor, subject to the constraint that pro…ts be non-negative. If this were not the case, an intermediary could o¤er a contract that was slightly more attractive to the depositors and capture a much larger share of the market, thus increasing pro…ts. In equilibrium, competition will drive the intermediaries'pro…ts to zero. Since there are complete markets, an intermediary's pro…ts are equal to the value of deposits received minus the cost of the consumption o¤ered to depositors, that is,
Note that we have written the budget constraint in expected value form: multiplying each price by a scalar (the probability of the corresponding state) is a normalization that does not a¤ect the decision for a suitable choice of prices. Then the intermediary's decision problem is
Similarly, we can think of insurance companies as o¤ering an optimal constract specifying consumption and insurance to their customers. Let a 2 (s) denote the consumption of the owners of the insured …rms at date 2 in state s (recall that the owners only consume at the last date) and let (s) denote the decision to provide insurance in state s ( (s) = 1 if the …rm is insured and is 0 otherwise). Free entry into the insurance sector ensures that the risk sharing contract o¤ered by the insurer must maximize the expected utility of the …rm subject to a non-pro…t constraint. In equilibrium, the insurers' pro…ts will be zero. The decision problem of an insurer is
Finally, we come to the investors. They are assumed to have direct access to …nancial markets, and so will maximize their own expected utility subject to a budget constraint. The investors'decision problem can be written as max E [ W 0 e 0 + e 1 (s) + e 2 (s)] s.t. E[ e 0 + q 1 (s)e 1 (s) + q 2 (s)e 2 (s)] 0:
Because markets are complete it does not matter who holds the assets. Without loss of generality we can assume a notional producer controls the investment technology, which is represented by a constant-returns-to-scale production set Y de…ned as follows:
0; + 2 + e 0 ; y 1 (s) ;
In words, at date 0 the producer invests in the short asset and in the long asset, where total investment in securities is bounded by the sum of the endowments of consumers and …rms plus the capital provided by the investors. The remainder 2 + e 0 ( + ) is invested in loans. At date 1 he can supply y 1 (s) units of the good and re-invest y 1 (s) in the short asset. At date 2 he can supply y 2 (s), which is bounded by the return on the short asset y 1 (s) plus the return on the long asset R plus the return on the loans to the intermediaries' customers (2 + e 0 ) (s)B. The producer's decision problem is to maximize pro…ts subject to this technology:
The linearity of the investment technology ensures that the producer's pro…ts are zero in equilibrium.
An allocation (a; c; e; y) is attainable if c 1 (s) + (s) (s)C + e 1 (s) = y 1 (s) and a(s) + (1 )c 2 (s) + e 2 (s) = y 2 (s) + (s)A for each s. An equilibrium consists of a price system q = (q 1 ; q 2 ) and an attainable allocation (a; c; e; y) such that the three decision problems are satis…ed. Since markets are complete the usual e¢ ciency results will hold. The allocation will involve risk being shared e¢ ciently across sectors.
The Modigliani-Miller theorem for risk sharing
In an Arrow-Debreu world, risk sharing is mediated by markets. In particular, "capital"e 0 is provided to the market and not to any speci…c individual …nancial institution. Similarly, there are no OTC derivatives traded between banks and insurance companies. Instead, they trade contingent commodities with "the market". One could introduce speci…c capital contracts between investors and bank or insurers, but these would be redundant securities. In fact, we can establish a Modigliani-Miller theorem for banks and insurers along the lines of Gale (2004) . For example, suppose that a bank wants to raise an amount of capital e 0 . It will o¤er investors a contract (e 0 ; e 1 ; e 2 ) under which it promises to pay investors e t (s) in state s and date t in exchange for the contribution of e 0 at date 0. In order to be acceptable to the investors, the capital contract (e 0 ; e 1 ; e 2 ) will have to satisfy the participation constraint E [ e 0 + e 1 (s) + e 2 (s)] 0:
The bank's objective function remains the same as before, but now the value of the capital contract is added to its budget constraint. Clearly, the bank will want to minimize the value of the contract in order to maximize the "market value"of the bank. Thus, an optimal contract will solve the problem min E[ e 0 + q 1 (s)e 1 (s) + q 2 (s)e 2 (s)] s.t. E [ e 0 + e 1 (s) + e 2 (s)] 0;
which is the dual of the investor's decision problem above. Because of the linearity of the problem, in equilibrium the market value of the contract is zero and the participation constraint is binding. In other words, the capital contract will have no e¤ect on the bank's budget constraint and no e¤ect on its objective function. Furthermore, the introduction of an explicit capital structure has no e¤ect on the endogenous variables we care about (the allocation of consumption and investment in assets) because the trades implied by the contract are o¤set in the contingent security markets.
Incomplete markets and incomplete contracts
The assumption of complete markets is extreme and eliminates the need for risk sharing arrangements between individual intermediaries and insurance companies. Suppose we get rid of markets for contingent commodities but allow a spot market for assets at date 1 (equivalent to a forward market for consumption at date 1). If we still allow intermediaries and insurers to write complete contracts, then markets are e¤ectively complete because there are only two representative agents (plus the risk neutral investors who receive no surplus). On the other hand, if intermediaries and insurers cannot write complete contracts, risk sharing may be ine¢ cient and there may be some scope for welfare-improving regulation. Whether this optimal regulation takes the form of minimum capital requirements is not clear. We next develop a simple numerical example to show that, with incomplete markets and incomplete contracts, there can be an increase in systemic risk from capital regulation that forces banks to hold too much capital.
Increased systemic risk from capital regulation
In this section we present a simple numerical example to illustrate that capital regulation can increase systemic risk. We start by considering the banking sector on its own and then go on to consider the insurance sector in isolation.
Without capital regulation we show that in the example there is no incentive to have credit risk transfer between the two sectors. However, with capital regulation where capital can be reduced when there is credit risk transfer between the sectors, we show that the transfer will take place. Moreover, this credit risk transfer can increase systemic risk in the banking sector.
The banking sector
No Capital To start with we consider what happens if there is no capital available. The return on the long asset is R = 1:25:
For the investors providing equity capital for banks = 1:5: For depositors in the banks = 0:5; U (c) = Ln(c):
For banks'loans B = 3: The probability of state H = the probability of state L = 0:5: In state H the probability of the high payo¤ B on …rms'loans is H = 1; in state L it is L = 0:4:
Banks investment in the short asset is denoted x and their investment in loans is denoted y: They receive an endowment of 1 from depositors so their investment in the long asset is 1 x y.
Consider …rst the case where there are no runs. Since there is no uncertainty about the banks'needs for liquidity at date 1 they will use the short term asset to provide consumption at date 1. The optimization problem of the banks is to choose x and y to In terms of checking that even in the worst state L at date 1 that there will not be a run, the late consumers will be better o¤ to keep their funds in the bank if U (x) 0:4U ((1 x y)R + By) + 0:6U ((1 x y)R)
In the example the left hand side is 0:693 and the right hand side is 0:661 so the condition is satis…ed and there will be no systemic risk in the banking industry.
The Role of Capital
Next consider what happens if there are investors who can make capital available to the banks. Since the investors are indi¤erent between consumption at date 1and date 2 it is optimal to set e 1 = 0 and invest any capital e 0 that is contributed in the long asset since this has a higher return than the short asset. In the case where the loans pay o¤ B it is possible to make a payout e 2 to investors.
Max 0:5U (x) + 0:35U ((1 + e 0 x y)R + By e 2 ) + 0:15U ((1 + e 0 x y)R)
In order for the investors to be willing to supply the capital it is necessary that e 0 = 0:7e 2 :
Hence the banks'problem becomes to choose e 0 ; x and y to The …rst thing to notice is that these cannot all be satis…ed. Since B > 0:7 the last two conditions cannot be simultaneously satis…ed. What is happening is that the risk neutral investors are supplying the funds for loans and the cost of these funds is less than the return from loans. Banks have an incentive to raise an in…nite amount of equity capital and fund loans with this. We assume there is a limited number of loans y = 0:3 and the owners of the …rms taking the loans therefore obtain the surplus. The amount paid on loans instead of being B will be 0:7 in equilibrium. Hence the relevant …rst order conditions become 0:5 x = 0:35R (1 x y)R + 0:7 y e 0 ( 0:7 R) + 0:15 (1 + e 0 x y) = 0 0:35( 0:7 R) (1 x y)R + 0:7 y e 0 ( 0:7 R) = 0:15 (1 + e 0 x y) Solving these and using the values of the example together with y = 0:3 we get e 0 = 0:16; e 1 = 0; e 2 = 0:34; x = 0:5; 1 + e 0 x y = 0:36 (1 + e 0 x y)R + 0:7 y e 2 = 0:75; (1 + e 0 x y)R = 0:45 EU = 0:567
The condition for not having a run is then U (x) 0:4U ((1 + e 0 x y)R + 0:7 (y e 0 )) + 0:6U ((1 + e 0 x y)R)
In this case the left hand side is 0:693 and the right hand side is 0:594 so the condition is satis…ed and there is again no systemic risk. Risk is not eliminated from the depositors'consumption even though the investors providing the capital are risk neutral because capital is costly. The expected utility is lower than with no capital because the …rms with the loans get the surplus.
The insurance sector
We next turn to the insurance sector and consider it on its own. As explained above there are …rms that own assets that produce A at t = 2. For our example, we assume that A = 1:3: The owners of these …rms have U = Ln(c):
With some probability (s) a …rm's asset is damaged at date t = 1. It costs C = 1 to repair the asset in which case it produces A at t = 2. Without repair the asset produces nothing. Insurance companies insure these …rms.
In state l the probability (l) = 0:5 and this state occurs with probability 0:9. In state h the probability (h) = 1 and this state occurs with probability 0:1.
The cost of an insurance company liquidating long term assets at date t = 1 if it goes bankrupt is such that the proceeds are zero: Grace, Klein and Phillips (2003) have found that for a large sample of insurers that went bankrupt from 1986-1999 the average cost of insolvent …rms accessing the guarantee funds was $1.10 per $1 of pre-insolvency assets. By way of contrast James (1991) found that the …gure for banks for the late 1980s was $0.30.
Each …rm has an endowment of 1 at date t = 0 that it can use to buy insurance or invest itself.
The insurance industry is competitive so the companies do not earn any pro…ts. The insurance companies can o¤er partial or full insurance to …rms. If they o¤er partial insurance they charge 0:5 at date t = 0. Suppose the …rms put the other 0:5 of their endowment in the long term asset (it will be shown this is optimal shortly). In order to have funds to repair the damaged assets the insurance companies must invest in the short asset so that they have liquidity at date t = 1. In state l the funds they need for claims to repair the damaged assets are (l)C = 0:5: They have funds of 0:5 and can pay all the claims to repair the damaged assets. The utility of the owners of the …rms is therefore U (A + 0:5R). In state h the insurance companies receive claims of (h)C = 1: They don't have su¢ cient funds to pay these so they go bankrupt. With partial insurance there is thus systemic risk in the insurance industry. When the insurance companies go bankrupt their assets are distributed equally among the claimants. The …rms receive 0:5 from the insurance companies' liquidation of its short term assets. The …rms can't repair their assets so these produce nothing. In state h the utility of the owners of the …rm is therefore U (0:5 + 0:5R): Their expected utility with partial insurance is EU partial = 0:9U (A + 0:5R) + 0:1U (0:5 + 0:5R) = 0:601:
Notice that if the …rms put the other 0:5 of the endowment in the short rather than the long asset they would be able to repair their assets in state h but they would only receive 0:5 in state l from their investment. Hence their expected utility would be EU = 0:9U (A + 0:5) + 0:1U (A) = 0:555; so they would be worse o¤.
If the insurance company o¤ered full insurance they would charge 1 at t = 0 and could meet all of their claims in both states. At t = 1 in state l they would have 0:5 left over. Since the industry is competitive they would pay this out to the insured …rms. In this case Again this is worse than partial insurance.
Thus the optimal scheme is for the insurance industry to partially insure …rms and to charge 0:5 at t = 0. The …rms put the remaining part of their endowment in the long asset.
The Role of Capital
In this case there is no role for capital in the insurance sector. Capital providers charge a premium. Their funds would have to be invested in the short asset. There are already potentially enough funds from customers to do this but it is simply not worth it. If there is a premium to be paid for the capital it is even less worth it. Capital will not be used in the insurance industry if they are not regulated to do so.
Bringing together the banking and insurance sectors
Now consider what happens if we consider the two sectors together and look at possible interactions. We start with the situation where there is no regulation and then go on to consider what happens with regulation.
No Regulation
Without any regulation both sectors have the same equilibrium as when they are considered on their own. There are no incentives for the insurance sector to insure the banking sector and have credit risk transfer. All the insurance sector could do is to hold the long term asset and pay o¤ when the loans default. But the banking sector can do this on its own. In fact with insurance the systemic risk means that there would be a strict loss in this case. The value of the long term assets held in the insurance companies would be lost in this case.
There is also no gain for the banking sector to bear the risk of the insurance sector. They would have to hold the short term asset but the insurance sector can do this just as e¢ ciently.
The Equilibrium with Ine¢ cient Capital Regulation in the Banking Sector Now suppose that the government requires banks to have a certain minimum amount of capital. There is no role for capital regulation in our model so it can have no bene…t. It may be harmless if the required level is below the optimal level. The more interesting case is when it is set at too high a level.
Suppose in our example that the government requires banks to have e 0 = 0:3 compared to the level of 0:16 which is optimal. The solution to the banks' problem then becomes e 0 = 0:3; e 1 = 0; e 2 = 0:643; x = 0:5; 1 + e 0 x y = 0:5 (1 + e 0 x y)R + 0:7 y e 2 = 0:625; (1 + e 0 x y)R = 0:625 EU = 0:582
In this case the left hand side is 0:693 and the right hand side is 0:470 so the condition is satis…ed and there is again no systemic risk in the banking sector.
Welfare is reduced by the ine¢ cient regulation. The extra funds are put in the long term asset but this is ine¢ cient because there is no welfare gain and there is a premium on the cost of equity capital.
Ine¢ cient Capital Regulation in Banking and Credit Risk Transfer to the Insurance Sector
Next consider what happens if we allow for the possibility of credit risk transfer from the banking sector to the insurance sector. It is supposed that the shocks to the two sectors are independent. The regulation is such that the existence of hedging of credit risk allows a reduction in the capital requirement. We suppose that by purchasing an insurance contract with cost of G = 0:041 at date 0 and a payo¤ of 0:041 R = 0:0513 at date 2 when loans do not pay o¤ it is possible for a bank to reduce its capital requirement to the optimal level of 0:16. The idea here is that the regulation does not work e¤ectively since under Basel II banks can use their own risk models. They can therefore construct their risk models to make it look as the hedging instument reduces risk the right amount to allow them to reduce capital to the optimal level. Notice that in order for this insurance contract to be such that the insurance companies break even, which is necessary because of competition, they will also provide a payment of 0:0513 when the loans do pay o¤. The insurance companies use the initial payment from the banks at date 0 to buy the long term asset and then pay out the proceeds when they are solvent. When they are not solvent the long term asset is wasted. The only point of the credit risk transfer is to arbitrage the ine¢ cient capital regulation in the banking sector. The key issue is whether the gain from this ine¢ cient risk transfer outweighs the ine¢ ciency of the capital regulation. It can be shown that in the example it does. So the expected utility of the banks depositors is improved relative to the case with no insurance policy (EU = 0:582) but of course they are not as well o¤ as in the case with no regulation (EU = 0:567) because the credit risk transfer is ine¢ cient.
As far as the no run condition is concerned the relevant state is where it is known loans have a low probability of paying o¤ in the banking industry and there is default in the insurance industry.
U (x) 0:4U ((1+e 0 x y G)R+ 0:7 (y e 0 ))+0:6U ((1+e 0 x y G)R))
In this case the left hand side is 0:693 and the right hand side is 0:695 so the condition is not satis…ed and there is a run. Systemic risk is introduced into the banking industry. A key question is what happens if there is a run on the bank. For simplicity, we assume the bank can liquidate its assets for their market value. Grace, Klein and Phillips (2003) do point out that the cost of liquidating bank assets is much lower for banks than insurance companies and we take this as the extreme case. We could of course allow for some small loss of asset value and all the results above would hold. The more ine¢ cient the banking regulation the greater this loss can be.
We have thus shown what we set out to namely that with ine¢ cient banking regulation credit risk transfer can increase overall systemic risk.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have developed a model of banking and insurance and shown that with complete markets and contracts intersectoral transfers are desirable. However, with incomplete markets and contracts credit risk transfer can occur as the result of regulatory arbitrage and this can increase overall systemic risk. The key question going forward of course is which view of credit risk transfer is empirically relevant. 
